gave me, even more unexpectedly, a role as a political actor (minor, to be sure) in the current cultural renaissance of Latin America, a continent with an Amerindian (or AfroAmerindian) face and a definite project to further a different version of the good life in this crucial moment of global metaphysical dejection. Be that as it may, the present occasion has a clear and dear emotional meaning to me. I would never have imagined that those distant lectures would turn out to be the ultimate cause of my being back here, today, to enjoy the exquisite privilege of paying homage to Marilyn Strathern.
As a rule, in eponymic Lectures the speaker is expected to start with some apt reference to the work of the honoured ancestor and then proceed as he or she pleases.
I am not going to do this. Marilyn Strathern is not a distant figure but a very much alive and much esteemed colleague, one who has taught me more than many an anthropological ancestor. Her work has been a major influence on mine not only ever since we met for the first time in 1997, but, as I came to realise, before I had even started to read her. When I arrived in Cambridge I was already in the process of becoming a Strathernian unawares -call it the aesthetic trap of the intellectual gift if you will. In short, were I a Hagener, I would be owing Marilyn many more fat pigs than I could ever hope to assemble. May the puny one I present to you (to her) today serve at least as a token of my undischargeable debt.
Moving briefly from Cambridge to Oxford, if you excuse me, I have chosen a passage from Lewis Carroll as a perfect fanciful rendering of a Strathernian analysis of any piece of ethnographic material ('the sense of outlandishness that Strathern's sheer originality can produce ' -Holbraad & Pedersen 2009: 372) . Reading a text by her is like opening a chapter of a book titled Marilyn Adventures in Otherland. Allow me then to cite this little passage from Though the Looking-Glass, which describes what Marilyn, I mean Alice, experiences when she enters the mirror-world:
Then she began looking about, and noticed that what could be seen from the old room was quite common and uninteresting, but that all the rest was as different as possible.
[…] 'They don't keep this room so tidy as the other,' Alice thought to herself… Let's call this passage 'learning to see in Anthropology'… This moment of traversing the mirror (in whatever direction, I hasten to add) is strongly evocative of the so-called 'ontological turn', to which my name, among those of a few other delinquents, has been associated. So here we are: I have chosen to pay homage to Marilyn Strathern by talking about the current ontological debate, since, as I see it, her work is one of the main inspirations of this debate, even if the fearsome word 'ontology' seems to be quite foreign to her own mode of expression.
On ontological delegation
In a well-known collection titled Thinking though things, thanks to which the expression 'ontological turn' acquired its controversial conspicuousness in anthropology, the editors mention a 'quiet revolution' led by authors like Wagner, Latour, Gell, Strathern and yours truly.
3 Rarely has such a mild adjective as 'quiet' 
1998.
4 I later came to realise that others far more competent than I had already defined the Modern philosophical revolution by precisely the opposite shift, i.e. from ontology (left to the hard sciences) to epistemology (the philosophers' and later the social scientists' province). I was not too far off the mark, then. In those paragraphs I observed the profound philosophical debt of our discipline to the Kantian epistemocritical turn, and called for a return of sorts to a 'pre'-Kantian, pre-modern even, speculative concern with ontological questions when it came to dealing with our ethnographic materials (I remind you that 'Speculative Realism' was yet to be born, at that remote epoch).
That call to arms was presented both as a proactive sublation of the 'crisis of representation' syndrome that problematised ethnography as an ultimately impossible task (the Writing Culture critique) and as a refusal to reduce anthropology to the ontologisation of human epistemology in the psycho-cognitivist style. It didn't deal so much, however (as did the post-modernist critique), with the problem of the representational credentials of the epistemic subject (its spurious claims to transparency, its monological elocution etc.), concentrating rather on the representational status of the object of ethnographic discourse, i.e. its 'nature' as consisting in representations (cultures, world-views, ideologies) which 'stood for' something else (power differentials, relations of production, ecological constraints, cognitive universals). I countered such current conceptions of anthropology as the reductive interpretation-explanation of allegorical meanings with the proposal that we should move from the epistemological critique of ethnographic authority to the ontological determination of ethnographic alterity, the elucidation of the terms of the 'ontological self-determination of the other', in other words, to a redefinition of anthropology as the comparative (i.e. expansive) description of tautegorical meanings.
This story has been retold an untold number of times. Let me just add here that I trace the 'ontological turn' to three historical stimuli, not just one.
The first was the crisis of representation, which destabilised the subject/object divide, just as it complicated the other two dualisms which, like the first one, are versions of the Culture/Nature distinction, this quintessential convention of Western ethno-anthropology: that between persons and things (also, humans and non-humans), on the one hand, and that between language meanings and extra-linguistic reality (concepts and objects), on the other hand. We know how the Gender of the gift, intensifying and as it were 'reflexifying' the lesson of Mauss, shattered the person vs.
thing presuppositional frame. By having Melanesian ontologies such as manifested in their 'knowledge practices' actively analyse, rather than being passively analysed by our own ontological determinations, the GoG offered us an entirely new take on some well-cherished tenets of our political economy (concerning production, gender, work, property, power, not to mention society and the individual). A note here: the notion of 'knowledge practice', so crucial to Strathernian anthropology, is a radically nonepistemological concept, notwithstanding its name. I deem it the very icon of what Gildas Salmon (we will come to him) called 'ontological delegation', the operation that dissolves the regrettable dualism between 'theory' and 'practice', first by subsuming theoretical knowledge under a generalised concept of practice, but at the same time making knowledge the very model case of practice. For let us not forget the role that the identification between social action and social analysis plays in GoG. This is not unrelated, I believe, to other 'outrageous' Strathernian subsumptive inversions, namely, the determination of production as a mode and a moment of exchange, and of exchange as a shift of 'subjective' perspectives rather than an 'objective' economic transaction.
As to the language/reality gap, let us just recall the visionary semiotics of Roy let me just say I am convinced that in the somber decades to come, the end of the world 'as we know it' is a distinct possibility. And when this time comes (it has already come, in my opinion) we will have a lot to learn from people whose world has already ended a long time ago -think of the Amerindians, whose world ended five centuries ago, their population having dropped to something like 5% of the pre-Columbian one in 150 years, the Amerindians who, nonetheless, have managed to abide, and learned to live in a world which is no longer their world 'as they knew it'. We soon will be all Salmon defines the notion of delegation in the following terms. When an analytical operation becomes too costly (politically and/or epistemically) to be realised in a sovereign, monopolistic fashion by the sociologist or anthropologist, he/she transfers it to the actors themselves. This causes a total rebooting of the investigative endeavour, forcing the analyst to confront the unexpectedly powerful speculative forces that spring from the actors, far more philosophically-minded (in a broad sense) than we normally take them to be. The notion of an ontological delegation means that the anthropologist is forced to take his/her own ontological assumptions out of the strongbox and risk their robustness and transportability by letting them be counteranalysed by indigenous knowledge practices, or, to put it differently, he/she defines whatever he/she is studying as a counter-metaphysics with its own requisites and postulates. Anthropology becomes comparative metaphysics even as metaphysics becomes comparative ethnography. And the anthropologist turns into an ontological negotiator or diplomat. To quote the position paper of the recent AAA symposium on the politics of the ontological turn, which I co-signed with Martin Holbraad and 
One or several wolves?
The title of this part comes from chapter two of A Thousand Plateaux (Deleuze & Guattari 1987 ) -we will see the multiple appositeness of it soon. My problem here is the 'grammar' of the concept of ontology, as we would say in the old days of the linguistic turn. Morten Pedersen (2012) remarks on the 'incredulity and shock' with which many students and scholars have received the introduction of the term in contemporary anthropological discourse, given its 'metaphysical, essentialist, absolutist connotation' (I believe he is paraphrasing Webb Keane here, but the outraged sentiment is widespread).
Let us start by recalling that 'ontology' is not the only philosophically charged word in use by anthropology. Not to speak of the very name of the discipline, a compound of two metaphysical, essentialist etc. philosophical concepts, we have been happily playing along with words like 'politics' or 'myth' (a philosophical concept if ever there was one) without much ado. Anthropology did not wait for 'ontology' to enter the stage to have its own metaphysics, 'the tacit', and here I quote Peter Skafish, metaphysics of anthropology, that poorly mixed, difficult-to-swallow cocktail of the phenomenological Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Foucault, and a little Marx, according to which everything human is constituted, in essence, from some mix of Zuhandenheit, lived experience, perceptual/cognitive forms, historical conditions, and that favorite metaphysical master concept of anthropology: practice. Unless that metaphysics is smoked out and exposed for what it is, the new, explicitly metaphysical metaphysics of anthropology … will not be heard. (Skafish 2014) Be that as it may, 'the proud word 'ontology'', as Kant once said, was not a newfangled recirculation of an archaic, ornate concept: suffice it to recall the wonderful paper by Irving Hallowell, 'Ojibwa ontology, behaviour, and world view', published 54 years ago. word, given the absolute absence of any exterior and superior arbiter. Ontological differences, to get to the point, are political because they imply a situation of warnot a war of words, as per the linguistic turn, but an ongoing war of worlds, hence the sudden, pressing insistence on the ontological import of our ethnographic descriptions, in a context in which the world ('as we know it') is imposed in myriad ways on other peoples' worlds (as they know them), even as this hegemonic world seems to be on the brink of a slow, painful and ugly ending. No arbiter, no God, no United Nations Protection Force, no police operation to bring delinquents into line. The war will be as often as not fought with guerrilla tactics, to be sure. Until the powers that be (I mean BP, Shell, Monsanto or Nestle) bring their atomics to the scene.
Is this a satisfactory answer to question of 'one or several wolves', i.e., ontologies, then? Maybe yes, maybe not. We're trying. It depends on how you use the word. There is nothing wrong, in principle, in talking of as many ontologies as there are cultures (I know Martin Holbraad disagrees; I agree with him, partially), just as you say of a given physical theory that it has its own ontology. As Salmon observed in his already mentioned paper, in many works that further the 'ontological program', the metaphysics of representation is shown to be much more efficaciously shattered by means of the ethnographic description of a countermetaphysics than by the internal demystification to which the post-modern criticism was adept. In the particular case of 'Amazonian perspectivism', an ethnographic concept which was consubstantial to a certain economy of the person where the position of the self was metaphysically encompassed by that of the other, the potential affine, the enemy, the problem of ethnographic authority was completely overtakenor perhaps sublated, forgotten by incorporation -by the ethno-anthropology, or indigenous metaphysics, of alterity.
9 "Warning: the expression 'the ontology of a theory' is sometimes misleadingly employed to designate the reference class or universe of discourse of a theory. The expression is misleading because ontologies are theories, not classes." (Bunge 1999: 201 native', the act of making room for the other (faire la place aux autres -Stengers), the obligation of letting the natives, whoever they are, have it, ontologically speaking, their own way. Lastly, the notion of a 'turn' means, and here I paraphrase Holbraad again, the act of deformation-translation-variation of certain conceptual certainties of the analyst so as to make sense, I mean, make real (which does not mean make actual) the certainties or, for that matter, the perplexities of the other. As Patrice Maniglier also wrote, 'it is the fact of variation that makes us think, never the naked fact [le fait nu, the naked truth, one might say] of whatever is the case'.
13
The good enough description already actualised other as against a self than the structure that makes exist a self and an other. This structure is that of possibility: Autrui is the possibility, the threat or promise of another world contained in the 'face/gaze of the other', i.e. in its perspective. In the course of social interaction with a concrete other, that world must always be actualised by a Self: the implication of the possible which is the Other is explicated by me. This means that the possible goes through a process of verification that entropically dissipates its structure. When I develop the world expressed by an
Other, it is so as to validate it as real and enter into it, or to falsify it as unreal (and then -if I am an anthropologist -explain why this is so). Deleuze indicated the limiting condition that allowed him to determine the concept of the Other: concentrate on, freeze-frame your description at the moment in which the expressed still has no existence (for us) beyond that which expresses it -the Other as the expression of a 13 Maniglier 2014b. The wolves never had a chance to get away and save their pack [becoming as multiplicity -EVC]: it was already decided from the very beginning that animals could serve only to represent coitus between parents, or, conversely, be represented by coitus between parents. Freud obviously knows nothing about the fascination exerted by wolves and the meaning of their silent call, the call to become-wolf. Wolves watch, intently watch, the dreaming child; it is so much more reassuring to tell oneself that the dream produced a reversal and that it is really the child who sees dogs or parents in the act of making love. Freud only knows the Oedipalized wolf or dog, the castratedcastrating daddy-wolf, the dog in the kennel, the analyst's bow-wow. (Deleuze & Guattari 1987: 49-50 Of course it would also be going too far to say that the fetishistic view is simply true: Lunkanka cannot really tie anyone's intestines into knots; Ravololona cannot really prevent hail from falling on anyone's crops. As I have remarked elsewhere
17
, ultimately we are probably just dealing here with the paradox of power, power being something which exists only if other people think it does; a paradox that I have also argued lies also at the core of magic, which always seems to be surrounded by an aura of fraud, showmanship, and chicanery. But one could argue it is not just the paradox of power. It is also the paradox of creativity. (Graeber 2005: 430. Emphases mine.) 'It was already decided from the very beginning', as Deleuze and Guattari might have said, that fetishes could serve only to represent necessary illusions conjured up by living in society. Marcio Goldman, in an article from which I stole this passage as well as the general spirit of the commentary, observes that Graeber's effort to save the Marxian notion of 'fetishism', namely, that fetishes are 'objects which seem to take on human qualities which are, ultimately, really derived from the actors themselves', is somewhat misplaced. Graeber does try somehow to reconcile the Merina to Marx, arguing that fetishes only become 'dangerous' when 'fetishism gives way to theology, the absolute assurance that the gods are real' (real as commodities, one might say). The problem, says Goldman (2009: 114ff) , is that this brave effort to save the natives' face is undertaken behind the latter's back, so to speak. One wonders, firstly, if the conversion of fetishism into 'a will to believe' that is at the root of (real, social) power would be accepted by the natives. And secondly, if such a reduction, which sounds more like an 16 Kopenawa & Albert 2010: 412. 17 [He refers the reader here to his Toward an anthropological theory of value: the false coin of our own dreams (New York: Palgrave, 2001).] essay at reconciling one explicit Western ontology (to wit, dialectical materialism) with the Merina's implicit one, rather than an effort to problematise our own assumptions, does not end up, more than simply leaving untouched, reinforcing our own ontological framework. Magical power, as the Merina conceive it, cannot exist… The so-called ontological turn is nothing more than a change in the disciplinary language-game that forbids, by declaring it an 'illegal move', such an analytical facility from the anthropologist's part. I have a feeling that much of the uneasiness or outright rejection of the ontological turn rhetorics comes from that restriction of the freedom allowed to the analyst: the freedom to stay put, to not move, to indulge in the understand Winnicott correctly -though there is no reason to insist upon its humanonly specificity (remember the Batesonian 'this is play' problem). Be that as it may, Winnicott is also the author of the wonderful concept of the 'good enough mother', the mother that is not always there, is not practically perfect in every way, leaves something incomplete as far as the desire of the infant is concerned, and therefore ends up by raising -unawares, as it were -a normal child. A more-than-good-enough mother would raise a less-than-normal-enough child. I like to think of a good ethnographic description as a 'good enough description'. Don't reduce the paradoxes.
That hateful expression, 'breaking a butterfly on a wheel', which a colleague was patronizing enough to evoke in order to hedge somewhat his harsh criticism of my work,
18 should be applied to what we do with, or rather, to the existential and intellectual work of the peoples we study. Anthropologists are butterfly collectors after all, pace Leach. We are always dealing with, we are only dealing with butterflies.
Delicacy (and elegance) is required; too much historicizing will crush the butterfly.
And just so I do not finish this lecture without making a reference to another of my bombastic admonishments, let me say a few words about the idea of 'taking seriously' the things the people we study tell us.
19 Our colleague Rane Willerslev (2013) has recently published a paper titled 'Taking Animism Seriously, but Perhaps Not Too Seriously?' in which he takes issue with the idea, by observing that among the Yukaghir, ridiculing the (animal etc.) spirits is integral to their game of hunting; the Yukaghir know that spirits are an illusion, but they ironically go along with it. We should not take indigenous animism (for example) too seriously, he concludes.
I will disregard the irony of having a dour Dane admonishing a happy-go-lucky
Brazilian not to take too seriously whatever there is to be taken. I will just repeat -I thought I had already explained myself about this in 'The Relative Native' -that to take seriously does not mean to believe (Willerslev seems to believe that Yukaghirs do not believe in their spirits), to be in awe of what people tell you, to take them literally when they do not mean to (not an easy distinction to make at all -if it is ever possible to use this Greek weapon of rhetoric deconstruction in other ethnographic contexts) 20 , to take it as a profound dogma of sacred lore or anything of the sort. It means to learn to be able to speak well to the people you study, to employ a central concept and concern of Bruno Latour -to speak about them to them in ways they do not find offensive or ridiculous. They do not need to agree with you completely -they will never do anyway; all we require is that they find our description a good enough one. It will always be a caricature of themselves, with certain traits exaggerated, others downplayed, certain points overstretched, others minimised, and so on. Ethnographers are not photographers -they are portrait artists. Every portrait is more or less a caricature, with no pejorative sense implied. As we know, oftentimes a proper, deliberate caricature captures the 'spirit' (the invisible likeness, as it were) of the person represented much more eloquently than a photograph. And finally, those peoples we call animists (for example) may choose to take whatever they posit, their animal spirits, say, seriously or otherwise -and I am sure context is an exceedingly important consideration here (think of spirit-induced disease, for instance). But anyway, first they have had to go to the trouble to invent (or discover) those spirits -one wonders if it was just to have something to make fun of! Before learning not to take them too seriously, we should learn not to take ourselves too seriously, because, when the chips are down, anthropology is always in the situation of playing croquet with flamingoes, to end this talk with another Alice quotation:
The chief difficulty Alice found at first was in managing her flamingo: she succeeded in getting its body tucked away, comfortably enough, under her arm, with its legs hanging down, but generally, just as she had got its neck nicely straightened out, and was going to give the hedgehog a blow with its head, it would twist itself round and look up in her face, with such a puzzled expression that she could not help bursting out laughing: and when she had got its head down, and was going to begin again, it was very provoking to find that the hedgehog had unrolled itself, and was in the act of crawling away: besides all this, there was generally a ridge or furrow in the way wherever she wanted to send the hedgehog to, and, as the doubled-up soldiers were always getting up and walking off to other parts of the ground, Alice soon came to the conclusion that it was a very difficult game indeed. (Alice in Wonderland, ch. 8).
The problem is, unfortunately, that one often has one's head hacked off in the game. But that's what we were here for in the first place, as anthropology is always about sticking one's neck out through the looking-glass of ontological difference.
